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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the different behaviors between new and continuing exporters
in response to exchange rate shocks. We establish a dynamic model, in which new
exporters strategically charge a lower price than continuing exporters in order to
increase their current sales and accumulate their consumer base in future periods. The
model predicts that new exporters adjust their price more aggressively relative to their
continuing counterparts in response to exchange rate fluctuations in order to build future
demand stock. Using a transaction-level dataset containing all Chinese exporters over
the 2000-2009 period, we find supporting evidence for the model’s predictions: new
exporters adjust their price 1.5 times more than the continuing exporter. Our findings
imply different exchange rate pass-through between new and continuing exporters, and
the various ratios of new exporters lead to different degree of exchange rate pass-through
across countries at the aggregate level.
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1 Introduction
New exporters differ from continuing exporters in a number of dimensions, e.g., not only in
their productivity (Aw et al., 2000; Eaton et al., 2007; Melitz, 2003), but also their market
demand (Eaton et al., 2007; Melitz, 2003; Foster et al., 2015; Roberts et al., 2012).1 These
heterogeneities imply that new exporters perform differently from continuing exporters
in international markets.
How to survive and grow in international markets are crucial for both new and con-
tinuing exporters. However, uncertainties in international markets, including exchange
rate fluctuations, result in a strikingly high turnover (failure) rate, especially for new
exporters (Bernard et al., 2007; Hu et al., 2016). Until so far, there is few study explores
the different strategic responses between new and continuing exporters under external
fluctuations, and how do the different responses shape future growth path for new ex-
porters.
To be specific, exchange rate fluctuation is one of the most common and important
uncertainties the exporting firms have to face in international markets. A vast amount
of literature documents the profound influence of exchange rate movements on exporters’
profitability through changing their markup, price, product mix, entry and exit decisions
(Chatterjee et al., 2013; Berman et al., 2012; Greenaway et al., 2008; Chen and Juvenal ,
2016; Li et al., 2015; Atkeson and Burstein, 2008). However, the heterogeneities in price
adjustments between new and continuing exporters under exchange rate fluctuations have
been neglected in previous literature. This research question is of economic importance
to uncover how new exporters survive and grow in international markets.
In order to fill the gap, we employ a detailed Chinese micro-level export data to
capture the heterogeneous responses between the two different groups. We find that
comparing with continuing exporters, new exporters tend to adjust their export price
more aggressively in response to exchange rate fluctuations. Our finding offers a new
perspective of firm-level heterogeneous price responses under exchange rate shocks, and it
also provides a possible explanation for the cross-country different ERPT: the ratio of new
exporters varies across countries. In addition, our finding sheds new light on the observed
declining pattern of exchange rate pass-through (ERPT thereafter) during the past two
1for instance, Aw et al. (2000) show that the average productivity is highest for continuing exporters
followed by the group of entrants, exits, and non-exporters. Foster et al. (2015) find that demand gaps
close slowly between continuing firms and new entrants.
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decades (e.g. Campa and Goldberg, 2005; Marazzi and Sheets, 2007): the globalization
trend in the past two decades brings a surge of new entrants into international markets,
which drives down the aggregate ERPT.
To motivate our study we first present two stylized facts: 1. the firm-level exporting
price is increasing in firms’ age in a particular market; 2. the firm-level exporting market
share also increase in firms’ age in the exporting market. These patterns we found are in
line with Piveteau (2016), who find a very similar pattern among French exporters.
Motivated by the observed patterns, we establish a simple dynamic model where firms
choose their export prices to maximize their long-run profits. In particular, this mod-
el features an endogenous demand accumulation mechanism where exporters optimally
choose their current export price to build their reputation for future demand stock at
the cost of lower current profits. The model predicts that the reputation building or
consumers accumulation is more important for new exporters than continuing exporter-
s.2 This implies that new exporters tend to lower their current price and increase their
current sales in order to obtain a higher demand in subsequent periods. In response to
exchange rate shocks, an appreciation for instance, new exporters have an incentive to
reduce their F.O.B export price more than their continuing counterparts to accumulate
their consumer base.
We test the predictions of the model with a rich dataset containing comprehensive Chi-
nese exporters during 2000-2009. This dataset provides detailed information on firm-level
export price, quantity by destination countries and HS 8-digit product codes. Combining
this dataset with the exchange rate information downloaded from Bloomberg, we find
that the price set by new exporters is 13.5% lower than that set by continuing exporters;
second, relative to continuing exporters, new exporters have lower sales for a particular
product in a given market; third, in response to a 10% appreciation of RMB, both new
and continuing exporters reduce their export price, but new exporters reduce an addi-
tional 0.65% than continuing exporters. Although this figure seems small, it accounts for
52% of continuing exporters’ price reduction in response to the same appreciation. All
results are consistent with the model’s predictions and robust to different specifications.
This paper is closely related to two strands of literature. First, it relates to the
2This is consistent with Piveteau (2016) and Rodrigue and Tan (2016). In particular, Rodrigue and
Tan (2016) shows that the consumer accumulation process last only 4-5 periods, and after that increase
sales cannot increase firm-level competition.
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recent and growing literature on the connection between the exchange rate fluctuations
and firm-level export performance in particular, the ERPT literature.3 The availability
of micro firm-level data encourages research to study the heterogeneous ERPT across
firms. Chen and Juvenal (2016) and Bernini and Tomasi (2015), for instance, find the
ERPT is decreasing in firm-level export quality. Berman et al. (2012) and Li et al.
(2015) document a negative relationship between the ERPT and firm-level productivity.
Amiti et al. (2014) address that the firm-level import intensity and export market shares
(markups) have negative influence on firm-level ERPT. Chatterjee et al. (2013) analyze
how multi-product firms respond to exchange rate fluctuations.
Our work contributes to the ERPT literature by offering a new dimension of firm-
level heterogeneity: a firm’s age in an exporting market affects its ERPT. The fact that
the ERPT varies widely across countries: 22% for the American importers (Gopinath
and Rigobon, 2008); 79% for Belgian exporters (Amiti et al., 2014); 77% for Brazilian
exporters (Chatterjee et al., 2013); 92% for French exporters (Berman et al., 2012) and
96% for China Li et al. (2015) can partly be explained by the cross-country different new
exporter ratios.
Second, our work relates to the literature studying firm-level dynamics in export
markets, particularly, the mechanism how the successful entrants survive and grow into
large exporters. As such, our work closely relates to that of Costantini and Melitz
(2008), Atkeson and Burstein (2008) and Arkolakis (2015). Unlike these papers, we
focus on firm-level dynamics through the evolution of firms’ consumer base rather than
productivity evolution. The evolution of demand is important for exporter’s growth in
international markets. Rodrigue and Tan (2016) and Piveteau (2016) suggest that a firm’s
active manipulation of its price and quality to optimally grow future demand improves
the firm’s long-run profitability and survival rate. New entrants aiming to build their
consumer base behave differently from their older cohorts. These works study firm-level
demand dynamics in a stationary framework. Our work contributes to the literature
by studying how differently the growing firms respond to exogenous shocks from the
continuing or maturing exporters. The different responses between new and continuing
exporters to exogenous shocks provides evidence for demand dynamics.
3For instance, Atkeson and Burstein (2008); Amiti et al. (2014); Berman et al. (2012); Chatterjee et
al. (2013); Campa and Goldberg (2005); Gopinath and Rigobon (2008); Knetter (1993); Giri (2012); Li
et al. (2015); Chen and Juvenal (2016),
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The rest of the paper will proceed as follows: section 2 describe the data we used
and present the stylized facts. Section 3 introduces the model and presents its testable
predictions. Section 4 outlines the empirical specifications and test the model’s predic-
tions. Section 5 presents the influence of new exporters on the average ERPT, and finally,
section 6 concludes.
2 Data and Stylized Facts
2.1 The Data
Our primary objective is to provide a simple characterization of the nature of firm-level
price and sale evolutions in export markets. The data we use is collected by the Chinese
General Administration of Customs (GAC) and reports detailed firm-level export and
import information during 2000-2009. Specifically, the data include information of the
traded F.O.B value, quantity and price at firm-level across products (disaggregate as
HS8 digit) and destination countries. These dimensions of firm-level export information
allow us to study the evolution of firm, product and destination specific market prices
over time. In Table 1, we report the descriptive statistics of the main variables we use in
the dataset. It includes logarithm of export price, export quantity, import revenue, the
number of destinations a firm exports to and the number of products a firm export in
the sample.
[Table 1: add a table here]
The exchange rate is the key variable in this paper, which we download from Bloomberg,4
which provides bilateral nominal exchange rates between major currencies and US dol-
lars. Using this information, we can calculate the nominal exchange rates between China
and its trading partners. We match the exchange rate information with the customs
data. Since Bloomberg reports the exchange rates for major currencies, the matching
4One advantage of using exchange rate information from Bloomberg is that the annual exchange rate
is calculated as the average mean over the monthly exchange rate. Therefore, the exchange rate in
Bloomberg has a high frequent and be more accurate. In contrast, other sources, such as PennWorld
Table or World Bank, only provide the exchange rate at the start/end of each year as the annual exchange
rate, which is less accurate.
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of the two datasets decreases our sample size.5 The matching rate is 40.0% overall the
total observations in the customs dataset, and the matched sample accounts for 46.3% of
the total export value.6 The matched sample includes 40 OECD countries with 16 cur-
rencies, including USD, AUD, EUR, CAD, DKK, HUF, NZD, GBP, JPY, SEK, KRW,
NOK, CHF, MXN, PLN, and CZK.
We use real exchange rates instead of nominal exchange rates in the empirical tests. To
construct real exchange rates, we deflate the nominal exchange rate by consumer prices.
The consumer price index (CPI) is obtained from the IMF website. CPI and CPIj
represent the consumer price index of China and of the corresponding trade country
j, respectively. We use ej and Ej to denote the real exchange rate and the nominal
exchange rate between the home country, China, and foreign country j, respectively. Ej
is defined as the price of the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency in country
j, for example, EUS was 0.125, i.e., one Chinese yuan was worth 0.125 USD according
to official nominal exchange rates. Under this definition, an increase in Ej represents an
appreciation of the domestic currency against a foreign currency. Finally, the bilateral
real exchange rate is given by
ej =
Ej × CPI
CPIj
(1)
To be consistent with the customs trade data, real exchange rates in our analysis
cover the period from 2000 to 2009. We use a log difference to measure the change in the
bilateral real exchange rate between China and country j at an annual basis:
∆ejt = log
(
Ej,t
Ej,t−1
)
+ log
(
CPIt
CPIt−1
)
− log
(
CPIj,t
CPIj,t−1
)
(2)
In Figure 1, we depict the trend of bilateral exchange rate (in both nominal and real
term) of CNY (Chinese Yuan) against a series of major currencies including USD, EUR,
CAD, AUD, JPY and GBP, respectively. In Figure 1, both the nominal and real exchange
rate are quite volatile during the sample period 2000-2009.
5We only focus on countries using major currencies in their international busyness settlement, includ-
ing international trade
6The matching rate is slightly low is because we only account for OECD countries and their corre-
sponding currencies. We drop small countries, whose currency is less likely to be used for invoicing in
the bilateral trade. For instance, most of the non-OECD countries invoice their import via USD, rather
than their own currencies. If keeps these countries in our sample may bias our estimation results. Thus,
Following Li and Zhao (2016) we constraint our study to the OECD countries, whose own currencies are
widely used in the international business settlement.
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[Figure 1 is to be here]
2.2 Stylized Facts
We document two stylized facts which characterize our data. Specifically, we investigate
the relationship between export price/quantity and the duration a firm exports a specific
product to a particular destination, which we refer to as age. Note that the age, which is
defined at firm-product-country-level, captures how many years a particular product has
been exported by a firm to a given market.
Before we present the stylized facts, we depict four figures to show the general relation-
ships between the export price, market share and ages. We classify firm-product-country
observations into different age groups, and calculate the average (median) export price
and market share. Figure 2 (Figure 3) depicts the relationship between the average
(median) price with age, while Figure 4 (Figure 5) depicts the relationship between the
average (median) export market share and age.
[Figure 2 is to be here]
[Figure 3 is to be here]
[Figure 4 is to be here]
[Figure 5 is to be here]
Figure 2 - Figure 5 show that the average (median) price and average (median) export
market share are both increasing in ages but at a diminishing rate. However, it is unclear
what factors have caused these depicted patterns.7 In order to uncover the relationship
between the firm-product-country age and firm-product-country-level export price and
export market share, we estimate a simple regression using firm-product-country-level
data.
Our simple exercise is to regress a current firm-level characteristics in a given desti-
nation country (export price, and export market share), denoted by xikjt on age, along
with a series of controls.
xikjt = α + β1age+ β2age
2 + χit + ηikjt + εikjt (3)
7Since in each age group, we have many firms exporting multi-products to various markets, these
patterns can simply result from product mix changes, export destination switching, etc.
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where χit contains firm-level characteristics: firm-level total import in year t and the
market share of product k in country j exported by firm i. ηkjt = ηikj + ηt captures
the firm-product-country fixed effects and year fixed effects. The market share, sikjt, is
calculated as:
sikjt =
Vikjt∑
i Vikjt
(4)
where Vikjt denotes the total sales of product i in market j exported by firm i in year t.
The market share sikjt is the revenue ratio of product k exported to country j by firm
i to the aggregate exports of k in the same country by all other firms.8 The results are
reported in Table 2.
[Table 2 is to be here]
The results in column 1 - 3 of Table 2 implies that firm-level export price is increasing
in firm age (see the positive and significant coefficient of age), but at a diminishing rate
(see the negative and significant coefficient of age2). At the meanwhile, results in column
4 - 6 suggest that firm-level exporting market share also increases in firm age, and the
increase rate exhibits a diminishing pattern. These observed patterns can be explained
by firm-level productivity evolutions which increase firm-level export markups over time
or any macro trend shifts world market demand for Chinese exports. We do not dispute
these explanations whatsoever, but notice that in the regressions we have controlled for
the firm-product-country fixed effects and year fixed effects, which, at some degrees, rule
out the impact of product and country specific factors and time trend on export prices
and market shares. Furthermore, in the price regression we have controlled for the market
share to alleviate the influence from markups.9 In the market share regression, we have
controlled for firm-level total imports, which proxy for firm-level productivity.
The truncated feature of the customs data ranging from 2000-2009 arises a concern
about our measure of firm age. We cannot know the age of a firm-product-country pair
if it appears since the year 2000.10 As such, our age measure is downward biased. To
8In our case, the numerator is a sum of the product values in a particular product category and
destination country exported by all Chinese exporters.
9According to Atkeson and Burstein (2008), firms with a higher market share tend to charge a higher
markup, which in turn, results in a higher price.
10To make this clear, consider that we observe firm i exporting product k to country j in the year
2000, but it does not imply this firm-produce-country pair is of age 1 in 2000, as this firm may have
started exporting k to j earlier.
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alleviate this concern, we re-estimate regression (1) by only keeping observations entering
our sample after the year 2000. In this way, we can precisely compute the age for each
firm-product-country pair. The results are reported in Table 3.
[Table 3 is to be here]
The results for both price (column 1 - column 3 of Table 3) and market share (column 4
- column 6 of Table 3) show very similar pattern as those in Table 3. Carefully comparing
the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 3 and Table 2, we find that the coefficient of
age in any column of Table 3 is larger than the counterpart in Table 2.
All stylized facts are consistent with a story where new exporters accumulate their
consumer base (or build their brand): a new exporter lowers its current price and increases
sales to grow its demand in the future. After the new entrant builds its consumer base,
it increases its export price to the optimal level. If the consumer accumulation process
exhibits diminished return, that is, demand growth is slower for a well-established firm
or product brand in a market, we should expect the patterns appeared in Table 2 and
Table 3. Furthermore, in Table 3 since we have deleted all firms entering our sample
before the year 2000 (or in the year 2000), whose ages are underestimated in Table 2, we
get a larger “grow” coefficient (coefficient of age). This pattern suggests that the new
exporters tend to grow faster than their older cohorts when the consumer accumulation
process exhibits a diminishing pattern.
In the next section, we develop a dynamic model of demand accumulation where new
exporters optimally set their prices to grow demand and maximize their long-run profits.
Based on this framework, we explore how the firm-level export profit being affected by
the exchange rate movements, and how new and continuing exporters respond differently
to exogenous exchange rate fluctuations.
3 Model
In this section, we develop a dynamic model to link firm-level export price to exchange
rate shocks. Based on this framework, we compare new and continuing exporters’ different
pricing strategy, as well as their different response to exchange rate movements.
To focus our analysis on the impact of exchange rate movement on firm-level export
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price, we have made a number of simplifying assumptions. First, similar to Amiti et al.
(2014), we do not model firms’ entry and exit decisions. This means that we condition
our analysis on a subset of firms: the continuing exporters and survived new exporters.
Second, the model is a partial equilibrium model. In the partial equilibrium framework,
we do not model the impact of exchange rate movements on the wage level, tariff, etc,
instead, we study the influence of exchange rates on firm-level export price by treating
wage and tariff are exogenous given or evolved independently from exchange rate changes.
3.1 Demand
The preference in country j are assumed to take a C.E.S. form as in equation (5)
[∫
i∈Ωj
(
θ
1
σ−1
ijt qijt
)σ−1
σ
] σ
σ−1
(5)
where qijt denotes the quantity of product i consumed in country j in year t.
11 θijt captures
consumers’ taste for variety i in country j at year t. A higher θijt implies more favorable
of product i in country j.12 The taste parameter acts as a demand shifter which contains
all factors affecting firm-level sales (e.g. Manova and Zhang, 2012; Rodrigue and Tan,
2016; Fitzgerald et al., 2016; Piveteau, 2016). 13 The current taste, θijt, is assumed to be
an increasing function of qij,t−1, the past sales of variety i in country j, θijt = θ(qij,t−1),
and satisfies
∂θ(qij,t−1)
∂qij,t−1
> 0 (6)
Equation (6) implies that firms with higher past sales have a larger current consumer
base (or a better reputation). Thus, the taste of consumers, θ(qij,t−1), increases in the
subsequent periods. We refer to this tendency as “reputation effect”. Based on our
11Note that in the framework of monopolistic competition, firms produce differentiated varieties, and
hence, we interchangeably use i to refer a firm and its product.
12The taste parameter will show up as a demand shifter (equation (7)), and the power term, 1σ−1 , on
the taste parameter is to make the demand shifter as θijt, which simplifies the presentation.
13Manova and Zhang (2012) attribute consumers’ taste to product quality while Rodrigue and Tan
(2016), Fitzgerald et al. (2016) and Piveteau (2016) believe firm-level reputation or consumer base is the
key to determine the taste parameter.
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stylized facts, we expect the reputation effect to exhibit a diminishing pattern:
∂2θ(qij,t−1)
∂q2ij,t−1
< 0 (7)
As shown by Rodrigue and Tan (2016), the reputation effect will reach its maximum
and disappears quickly after several periods a firm consecutively exports to a market (e.g.
three or four years in the stylized facts). As such, we assume
∂θ(qij,t−1)
∂qij,t−1
= 0 for contin-
uing exporters.14 We adopt several criteria to distinguish new entrants from continuing
exporters in the empirical parts.
3.2 Supply
A domestic firm i, which exports to country j, faces three types of transaction costs
altogether: an iceberg trade cost, τjt > 1, a fixed exporting cost, fijt = fj + ijt, and
additional per unit distribution cost in destination j. Note that the fixed exporting cost
contains two components: the time-invariant part fj and a per-period random shock ijt,
with ijt ∼ N(0, σ). Firms which draw a bad shock chooses to exit the market. The
distribution cost captures the selling or storage costs in country j which is paid in the
currency of the destination country. We denote the distribution cost as ηjtwjt, where wjt
and ηjt separately denote the labor wage and the distribution service labor requirement
for per unit sold in country j. If an exporter charges an F.O.B price of pijt, the price
faced by consumer in market j is
p∗ijt = pijtτjtejt + njtwjt (8)
where ejt denotes the exchange rate between country j and the home country of firm
i in year t. p∗ijt denotes the consumer faced price in country j. We decompose the
exchange rate into a time-invariant part, ej, and a random part εjt : ejt = ej + εjt,
14Notice that we ignore the influence of product quality on consumers’ taste. However, notice that
in this paper we attempt to document the different responses of new entrants and continuing exporters
to shocks (e.g. exchange rate shocks), and further disentangle the behind mechanism. This means that
once product quality keeps constant or firms cannot adjust product quality as flexibly as their price in
response to exchange rate shocks, introducing product quality into taste function would not alter the
following propositions. We can rewrite equation (2) and (3) as
∂θ(qij,t−1,xijt)
∂qij,t−1
> 0 and
∂2θ(qij,t−1,xijt)
∂q2ij,t−1
< 0,
where xijt denote the product quality of firm i exporting to country j in the year t.
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with εjt ∼ N(0, σε). The time-invariant component denotes the exchange rate in the
steady state, and εjt captures random shocks to the exchange rate.
15 The exchange rate
is defined as the domestic currency in terms of the foreign currency, and an increase in
ejt implies an appreciation of the domestic currency against the currency in country j.
3.3 Profit Maximization
The quantity demand for variety i of country j in year t is
qijt = Ajtθ(qij,t−1)[pijtτjtejt + ηjtwjt]−σ (9)
where Ajt denotes the residual demand shifter of market j in year t, Ajt = YjtP
σ−1
jt . Pjt
and Yjt are the price index and the total income of country j in year t, respectively.
16 By
assumption, the sequences of {wjt, τjt, ηjt}t evolve exogeneously, and are not affected by
exchange rate changes. Firms maximize the following long-run value function:
V (qij,t−1, fijt, ejt) = max : Ajtθ(qij,t−1)σ−1[pijtτjtejt + ηjtwjt]−σ(pijt − cit)− fijt
+ ρEV (qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1) (10)
where we assume the fixed exporting cost fijt is paid by firm i’s domestic currency. cit
denote firm i’s marginal production cost. V (·) denotes the value function conditional on
firm-level past export, qij,t−1, fixed exporting cost, fijt and the current exchange rate,
ejt. Note that in equation (10), uncertainties in the future arise from shocks to the fixed
exporting cost, ij,t+1, and the exchange rate, εjt, respectively.
15The random shocks are assumed to be i.i.d, but all results still hold if the random shocks are serial
correlated if the serial correlation is sufficiently low. The proof for the serial correlated exchange rate
shocks is in the Appendix.
16The price index is defined as a weighted average price of country j in year t, Pjt =(∑N
h=1 Lh
∫∞
ϕ∗hjt
[
σwht
σ−1
(
1
σ
ηjtwjt
wit
+
ehjtτjt
ϕ
)]1−σ
dG(ϕ)
) 1
1−σ
, where ehjt is the bilateral exchange rate of
country h and country j and τhjt the bilateral trade cost in year t. As in Berman et al. (2012), the num-
ber of firms who get a productivity draw is proportional to population size Lh in country h. Pjt depends
on the bilateral exchange rates of country j with all its trading partners. In the price index, a measure
of the exchange rate of the country appears in the second part of the bracket(in a nonlinear way). It is
the weighted sum of bilateral exchange rates of country i with all its trade partners. An exchange rate
appreciation of country j in year t that decreases Pjt leads to a fall of the volume of exports from an
exporter of the home country.Following Berman et al. (2012) and Chatterjee et al. (2013), we assume
that the home country is too small for its bilateral exchange rate to affect the price index in country j
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For continuing firms, their reputation has been successfully established, and hence,
the taste function does not increase in past sales anymore,
∂θ(qij,t−1)
∂qij,t−1
= 0, which leads to
∂EV (qijt,fij,t+1,ej,t+1)
∂qijt
= 0.17 As such, continuing exporters maximize their current profits,
and the optimal price is
pcijt =
σ
σ − 1cit +
1
σ − 1
ηjtwjt
τjtejt
(11)
where pcijt denotes the F.O.B export price of continuing exporter i at time t in country j.
Equation (11) gives the optimal price for continuing exporters, which relies only on the
firm-level marginal production cost, distribution cost and the exchange rate, ejt.
For new exporters, their taste function in period t + 1, θ(qijt), is influenced by their
sales in period t. As such, different from continuing exporters,
∂EV (qijt,fij,t+1,ej,t+1)
∂qijt
> 0 for
new exporters.
Take derivative of equation (10) w.r.t. pijt, and we get:
peijt =
σ
σ − 1cit +
1
σ − 1
ηjtwjt
τjtejt
− σ
σ − 1ρEV
′
1(qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1) (12)
where, peijt denotes the F.O.B export price of new exporter i at time t in country j. To
obtain equation (12), we have made use of the fact
∂qijt
∂pijt
= Ajtθ(Mij,t−1) (pijtτjejt + ηjwj)
−σ−1 (−σ)τjejt
In the economy, a series of variables evolve exogenous, {ejt, τjt, wjt, Ljt, ηjt}jt, new
and continuing exporters make their export price and quantity decisions according to
equation (9), (10) and (12). We summarize the crucial predictions on firms’ price setting
in Lemma 1, and describe the stationary equilibrium equilibrium in the Appendix.
We summarized the stationary equilibrium in the Appendix. The remaining crucial
results for firm’s price choices are summarized below.
Lemma 1. The representative new entrant’s value function is increasing in its past mar-
ket share, EV e′1 (qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1) > 0
Lemma 1 states that the past sales increase a firm’s future valuation (for new exporters
17The intuition is that for continuing exporters, their reputation has reach its maximum, and hence,
an increase in their current sales does not increase their reputation any further. Therefore, an increase
in the current sales does not increase the future valuation of continuing exporters.
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only). The intuition follows that: when two identical firms enter the same market, the
firm with higher past sales will earn more profits than the other in every subsequent
period. As a result, the total future valuation is increasing in firm-level past sales. The
proof is in the Appendix.
Further when the θ function is concave in the past sales , qij,t−1, the current profit
function is also concave in the past sales, qij,t−1. This is a sufficient condition for the
value function to be concave in qij,t−1.
Lemma 2. When the θ function (taste) is concave in the past sales, qij,t−1, the value
function, V (qij,t−1, fijt, ejt) is also concave in qij,t−1:
∂2V (qij,t−1, fijt, eijt)
∂q2ij,t−1
< 0
Lemma 2 demonstrates that although a firm’s value increases in its past sales, the
increasing rate exhibits a diminishing pattern. Such diminishing pattern has been clearly
observed in the stylized facts.
With Lemma 1 and 2, we first compare the pricing strategy between the continuing
and new exporters, in equation (11) and (12), respectively. All other things equal, the
new exporters tend to charge a lower price relative to the continuing firms. This is
because EV ′1(qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1) > 0 (from Lemma 1). This is intuitive: in order to build
the reputation, new exporters are willing to lower their current price to sell more. A
higher current sale leads to a better reputation, and hence, a higher future taste for
the product, which shifts up the future demand and brings lager future profits. On the
contrast, the continuing exporters cannot further increase their reputation, and the future
taste. Therefore, they have no incentive to lower their current price. Furthermore, the
concavity of the value function and equation (12) further implies that the price of new
exporters increases over time, but at a diminishing pattern. We summarize our model’s
predictions in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. When the taste, θ function, is concave in the firm-level past sales, qijt,
the new exporters will charge a lower price relative to continuing exporters. The price
charged by new exporters tend to increase, but at a diminishing way.
Next, we investigate the response of the new and the continuing exporters to an
exchange rate shock. In order to analyze the response of continuing exporters to an
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exchange rate shock, we differentiate equation (11) and (9)w.r.t εjt:
∂pcijt
∂εjt
= − ηjtwjt
(σ − 1)τjt
1
e2jt
< 0 (13)
∂qcijt
∂εjt
= θ(qij,t−1)[pcijtτjtejt + ηjtwjt]
−σ−1
[
−σAjt
(
pcijtτjt + τjtejt
∂pcijt
∂εjt
)]
< 0 (14)
Inequality (13) implies that the continuing exporters will decrease their F.O.B ex-
port price in response to an appreciation in the domestic currency (an increase of εjt).
Inequality (14) says that the export quantity for continuing firms decreases in exchange
rate shocks. The intuition is that although the F.O.B export price decreases in response
to an appreciation, the consumer faced price increases in country j. Hence the export
quantity negatively responds to the appreciation (e.g. Berman et al., 2012; Chen and
Juvenal , 2016; Chatterjee et al., 2013).
For new exporters, we differentiate equation (12) and (9)w.r.t. εjt:
∂peijt
∂εjt
= − ηjtwjt
(σ − 1)τjt
1
e2jt
− σρ
(σ − 1)EV
′′
11(qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1)
∂qeijt
∂εjtjt
< 0 (15)
∂qeijt
∂εjt
= θ[peijtτjejt + ηjwj]
−σ−1
[
−σAjt
(
peijtτj + τjejt
∂peijt
∂εjt
)]
< 0 (16)
where
∂qeijt
∂εjt
< 0 iff pijtτjt + τjtejt
∂pijt
∂εjt
> 0. In the Appendix, we show that pijtτjt +
τjtejt
∂pijt
∂ejt
> 0.18 Inequality (15) is because the concavity of the value function, EV ′′11 < 0,
and
∂qeijt
∂εjtjt
. Comparing the price responses of continuing and new exporters in (13) and
(15), we have:
∂peijt
∂εjt
<
∂pcijt
∂εjt
, (17)
Inequality (17) implies that in response to exchange rate shocks, new exporters adjust
their export price more aggressively relative to continuing exporters. The intuition is that
a domestic currency appreciation increases the price faced by foreign consumers, which
makes it more difficult for new exporters to accumulate their consumer base. Therefore,
they have to reduce their F.O.B export price more.19 As a result, the export quantity of
18The detailed proof is available in the Appendix. The intuition is that when domestic currency
appreciates, although export firms decrease their F.O.B price, the price faced by consumers in the
destination increased.
19On the contrast, it is easier to accumulate the consumer base during a depreciation period. Con-
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new entrants decrease fewer than that of continuing exporters in response to a domestic
currency appreciation. From quantities response (14) and (16), and given
∂peijt
∂εjt
<
∂pcijt
∂εjt
,
we have |∂qeijt
∂εjt
| < |∂qcijt
∂εjt
|. We summarize these results in the following proposition:
Proposition 2. When a firm’s value function is concave in its past sales, the new ex-
porters adjust their price more and export quantities fewer relative to continuing exporters
in response to an exchange rate shock.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Export Price and Quantity
In this section, we empirically test the model’s predictions using the disaggregate firm-
product-country-level export data. We first examine the export price and quantity differ-
ence between the new and continuing exporters. We estimate the following specification:
lnxikjt = α + β1entryikjt + β2importi,t−1 + β3shareikj,t−1 + ηijkt + εikjt (18)
where lnxikjt denotes the firm-level characteristics including the log export price and
quantity of product k exported to market j by firm i in the year t. entryikjt is an entry
dummy at firm-product-country-level. entryikjt takes the value of 1 if firm i exports
product k to country j in year t, but does not export in year t − 1, 0 otherwise. This
definition is referred as entry 1 thereafter. To avoid estimation bias caused by re-enters,20
we construct an alternative definition for the entry dummy. In particular, entryikjt takes
value 1 if firm i export product k to country j in year t, but does not export in year t− 1
and t− 2, 0 otherwise.21 This definition is referred as entry 2 thereafter.22 importi,t−1 is
sequently, new exporters have a lower incentive to cut their price, since the decreased consumer price
in international markets help firms to accumulate their consumer base. As a result, we expect to ob-
serve new exporters increase their price more relative to their continuing counter parts in response to a
depreciation.
20Re-enters are firms which had exported to a particular market, exit afterward, and enter the same
market again. These re-enters might have consumer base in the market they had exported, and hence,
their pricing strategy is not comparable to that of new entrants.
21In the second definition, entrants are those firms which do not have the export record in a particular
market two periods before.
22The detailed annual export entry rates have been reported in Table 13 in the Appendix. The figures
in Table 13 show that the entry ratios are quite similar in these two entry definitions. In addition, the
entry ratios exhibit substantial annual fluctuations.
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the total import values of firm i in year t− 1, which controls for imported intermediate
inputs in the production. shareikj,t−1 is the market share, which controls for a firm-
product specific market power in country j.23 ηikjt = ηikj + ηt, which captures the
firm-product-country fixed effects, and year fixed effects. εikjt is the unobservable error
term. The results of export price and quantity are reported in Table 4 and 5, respectively.
[Table 4 is to be here]
[Table 5 is to be here]
In column 1 - 2 of Table 4, the export price results are obtained using the entry
dummy of entry 1, while in column 3 - 4, the results are obtained using the entry dummy
of entry 2. Relative to column 1 and column 3, column 2 and column 4 add more controls,
respectively. All results indicate a negative and significant coefficient of the entry dummy,
no matter how we define it. This implies that new exporters tend to charge a lower price
than their continuing counterparts. In particular, the results in column 2 and 4 suggest
that the price charged by new exporters are 2%−3% lower than that charged by continuing
exporters. These results are comparable with Rodrigue and Tan (2016), who find that
the price charged by growing firms (new entrants) are 0.5% lower than that charged by
stable firms (continuing exporters).24
In addition, the coefficients of control variables have the expected signs. The positive
coefficient of firm-level total import implies that firms use more imported intermediate
inputs charge a higher export price. This is in line with the literature (Manova and
Zhang, 2012; Bas and Strauss-Kahn, 2015) that firms using more imported intermediates
offer higher quality products, and hence, charge a higher price (markup). The coefficient
on market share is also positive and significant, which suggests that firms with larger
monopolistic powers tend to charge a higher price, which is consistent with Atkeson and
Burstein (2008).
23Atkeson and Burstein (2008) point out that firms with different market share will charge different
export price.
24The reason they obtain a smaller figure (0.5%) than ours (2%) is that they compare the average price
charged by new entrants along their growth path with continuing firms, but we only compare the price
charged by new entrants in the first period with continuing firms. The concavity feature of the value
function implies that the price difference between new and continuing exporters diminished with the
time new exporters entered in a particular market. Therefore, the price difference reaches its maximum
when comparing new entrants and continuing firms. As such, we have a larger figure.
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Similarly, column 1 - 2 of Table 5 report the export quantity results using an entry
dummy of entry 1, while column 3 - 4 contain the results using an entry dummy of
entry 2. All results demonstrate that new entrants export fewer quantities relative to
continuing exporters. Specifically, the results in column 2 and column 4 show that new
exporters export 20%− 25% fewer quantities than continuing exporters after controlling
for firm-level characteristics. These results support our demand growth story and in line
with Rodrigue and Tan (2016) and Piveteau (2016).
Together with the stylized facts, we have found supporting evidence of Proposition
1: first, new exporters charge a lower price than continuing exporters; second, although
new exporters’ price is increasing in their exporting age, the increase rate displays a
diminishing pattern.
4.2 Response of Export Price and Quantity to Exchange Rate
Shocks
In this section, we test Proposition 2 by investigating how new and continuing exporters
adjust their export price (quantity) in response to exchange rate shocks. The difference
in their price responses to exchange rate shocks is the main focus of this paper. To do
so, we estimate the following benchmark specification:
∆lnxikjt = α + β1∆exrjt + β2∆exrjt × entryikjt + χikjt + ηkjt + εikjt (19)
where similar to regression (18), lnxikjt denotes the firm-level characteristics including log
export price and quantity. exrjt denotes the nominal exchange rate between the home
country and country j in the year t. χikjt includes firm-level controls: the changes in
market share and firm-level total imports. ηkjt = ηikj + ηt captures the firm-product-
country fixed effects and year fixed effects. Note that we use the first difference of
log variables, and hence, the coefficients β1 and β2 represent the short-term response
of export price and quantity to exchange rate shocks. The results of export price and
quantity responses to exchange rate shocks are reported in Panel A of Table 6 and Panel
A of Table 7, respectively.
According to the definition of entryikjt, entryikjt = 0 if product k has been consecu-
tively exported to country j by firm i for two or more than two years. It is arguable that
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treating a 2-year old firm-product-country pair as continuing exporters are problemat-
ic. Although this possible misclassification does not affect the sign of the entry dummy,
it brings a downward bias to the magnitude.25 As such, treating a 2-year old firm as
a continuing exporter might downward bias our results.26 To alleviate this concern, we
estimate an alternative specification, in which we substitute the entry dummy in the spec-
ification (19) by age defined at firm-product-market level . The benefit of substituting
the entry dummy by age is that we can measure the different price and quantity responses
of firms at different age groups without distinguishing their entry and continuing status.
∆lnxikjt = α+δ1∆1exrjt+δ2∆exrjt×ageikjt+δ3∆exrjt×age2ikjt+γχikjt+ηkjt+εikjt (20)
where ageikjt is the number of years a particular product k being exported to country j
by firm i until year t. The regression results of specification (20) are reported in Panel B
of Table 6 and Table 7, respectively.
[Table 7 it to be here]
[Table 8 is to be here]
In Table 6, the results, in the first row across all columns, indicate that in response to
a domestic currency appreciation (an increase in exr) the firm-level export price decrease.
Specifically, a 10% appreciation in the domestic currency leads to a 0.9%− 1.4% export
price decreases. This result implies an incomplete ERPT and comparable to the results
in Li et al. (2015).27 More importantly, the coefficients on the interaction terms, ∆exr×
Entry1 and ∆exr×Entry2, are both negative and significant. In particular, in response
to an appreciation, although price cut is small for both new and continuing exporters,
the price cut by new exporters is about 1.5 time of that cut by continuing exporters.28
25To make this point clear, recall that a continuing firm does not need to accumulate their future
consumer base, but a 2-year old firm might still need to. If a 2-year old firm still need to accumulate
its consumer base, according to our model, its price response to exchange rate shocks is larger than
“genuine” continuing exporters, although it is smaller than new entrants.
26However, due to the concavity of the value function in past sales, the comparison between new
entrants and 2-year old exporters would still give us a negative coefficient of the intersection. As the
concavity feature leads to a smaller ERPT for new entrants relative to 2-year exporters.
27Li et al. (2015) use China’s firm-level export data during 2000-2006, and find that with a 10%
appreciation of RMB, export price drops by 0.35%. Our results are higher than theirs’s estimation due
to the following reasons: (1) our sample is from 2000 to 2009, unlike their sample in 2000 to 2006, and it
covers a longer period after the China’s exchange rate reform in July 2005. (2) our sample only contains
40 major export destinations, rather than overall destinations appearing in the customs dataset.
28The calculation is based on the results in column 4 of Table 7: 0.049+0.0950.095 = 1.52.
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Similarly, the coefficients on the interaction term, ∆exr×age, is positive and significant.
This implies that firm-product-country pairs with an older age tend to adjust their price
less in response to an exchange rate shock. This result is in line with our results using
entry dummies. Furthermore, the coefficient on ∆exr × age2 is negative and significant.
This means that in response to an appreciation the firm-level export price is decreasing
in age, but at a diminishing rate. This result is also consistent with our model: the
concavity of the value function defined in equation (8) predicts that firm-level price
response to exchange rate shocks is decreasing in firm age, and when a firm grow to be
a continuing exporter, its price response to exchange rate shocks does not rely on its age
anymore.
The results in Table 7 convey the information that with a 10% appreciation of RMB,
the firm-level export quantities decrease by 3.34%−7.57% (column 4 and column 8). The
coefficients of ∆exr×Entry1 and ∆exr×Entry2 are both positive and significant (column
1 - column 4), and the coefficient of ∆exr×age is negative and significant. These results
indicate that the export quantity decreases more for continuing exporters in response to
an appreciation of the domestic currency. This is because that new exporters cut their
export price more in response to the appreciation. These results are consistent with
Proposition 2.
Interestingly, we notice that the interaction term, ∆exr × Entry has a larger coeffi-
cient, in terms of absolute value, than the coefficient of ∆exr. This implies that while
an appreciation of RMB decreases the exports of continuing exporters, it increases ex-
ports of survived new exporters. One possible explanation is that new exporters start
exporting at a small amount, and their export growth heavily relies whether they can
overwhelm the other new entrants to build their consumer base. As such, different from
the continuing exporters, which have a stable consumer base, the new exporters’ growth
mainly determined by competition from other new exporters. Although an appreciation
decreases exports of new exporters, it also discourages entry (Berman et al., 2012; Green-
away et al., 2008). As such, the demand grows faster for survived new exporters due to
less competition. In contrast, The continuing firms have stable demand and their export
quantities are less likely to be affected by competition from new entrants.
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4.3 Robustness Checks
A substantially large portion of exporters in China export multi products. 76.5% of
exporting firms in China produce more than one product during 2000-2009. Note that
continuing exporters are normally large in their size and market demand (Foster et al.,
2015; Aw et al., 2000) and be able to cover the fixed export cost to export multi products
(Bernard et al., 2010). On the contrast, new entrants tend to be small and exporting
single product. Chatterjee et al. (2013) and Bernard et al. (2011) find that multi-product
firms disproportionally adjust markups across their products in response to exchange rate
changes. Mayer et al. (2015) document that multi-product firms frequently switch their
export mix, which causes a cannibalization effect. This effect will result in price and
quantity internal adjustments within a multi-product firm. As such, the different export
price (quantity) responses to exchange rate shocks might just reveal the different price
strategy between multi-product and single-product firms. To alleviate the concern, we
keep all firms exporting single product and estimate the benchmark specification (19).
The exclusion of multi-product firms leads our sample size to reduce from 10, 348, 740 to
1, 413, 051, which accounts for 13.7% of the overall sample. The results are reported in
Table 8.
[Table 8 is to be here]
The price results in column 1 - 4 of Table 8 exhibit similar patterns as our benchmark
regression results in Table 6. The negative and significant coefficients of the interactions,
∆exr×Entry1 and ∆exr×Entry2, show that new exporters tend to adjust their export
prices more aggressively relative to continuing exporters. The export quantity results
are reported in column 5 - column 8 of Table 8. These results are comparable to the
results in Table 7: in response to an (a) appreciation (depreciation) of RMB, export
quantities increase (decrease) for new single-product exporters, while export quantities
decrease (increase) for continuing single-product exporters.
Another concern arises from export market switching or expanding. To make this
point clear, consider a firm i export product k to country j, in response to exchange
rate shocks, firm i can switch its export of k from country j to country j′ or export
k to both j and j′. No matter which happens, firm i is a new exporter in country j′.
However, the exporting experience of exporting k to country j might help firm i to build
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consumer base in the country j′ through spillover effect.29 To avoid exporting destination
switching or expanding to bias our results, we further exclude the firm-product pairs which
have been exported to multiple destinations from our single exporter subsample. In this
way, we construct a subsample containing firms which export a single product to only 1
destination. This further deceases the observations to 362, 724, which accounts for 25.7%
of the major product sample. We estimate specification (19) with our single-product-
country subsample. The results are reported in Table 9.
[Table 9 is to be here]
The export price and quantity results are reported in column 1 - 4 and column 5 -
8 of Table 9, respectively. All results indicate that after excluding market switching or
expanding exporters, our benchmark results still hold.
Lastly, according to Rauch (1999) we divide our sample into firms exporting homo-
geneous and heterogeneous products. We regress the two subsamples using specification
(19). The export price and quantity results are respectively reported in Table 10 and
Table 11.
[Table 10 is to be here]
[Table 11 is to be here]
Most results in Table 10 and Table 11 reveal very similar patterns with our bench-
mark results, but the export price responses of homogeneous exporters. Interestingly, we
find that in Panel A of Table 10 the coefficients of interaction terms, ∆exr × Entry1
and ∆exr × Entry2, although are negative, only significant at 90% level. Therefore,
we cannot rule out the possibility that the coefficients of intersection terms equal to ze-
ro. This result is of economic interpretations: elasticity of substitution across different
varieties in homogeneous sectors is larger than that in heterogeneous sectors. Due to
the product similarity feature, new entrants exporting homogeneous product can easily
attract consumers from their older counterparts. As such firms exporting homogeneous
products have a lower incentive, relative to firms exporting heterogeneous products, to
accumulate consumer base as their products are highly standardized.
29This is more likely to happen when country j′ and j are closely related, such as the two countries
are adjacent, speaking the same language, has small cultural distance, etc.
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5 ERPT and New Exporters
In the above sections, we have documented the fact that new exporters have different
ERPT from continuing exporters. In particular, in response to exchange rate shocks,
new exporters adjust their price 1.5 times more than that of continuing exporters (based
on the results in column 2 of Table 6: -0.145 V.S. -0.091). The empirical results imply
that the average ERPT level depend on the entry ratio. In Table 12, based on our baseline
estimates (column 2 of Table 6) we calculate the average ERPT level at different entry
ratios. We use x to denote entry ratio and the calculation is according to the following
equation.
ave ERPT = [10%− 1.45% · x− 0.91% · (1− x)]/10%
[Table 12 is to be here]
Table 12 reports the average ERPT at entry ratios equal to 10%, 25%, 50%, 75% and
95% , respectively. The results demonstrate that the average ERPT level is decreasing
in the entry ratios: a larger proportion the new exporters accounting for, the lower the
average ERPT is. In particular, the ERPT exhibits 5 percentage difference when new
exporters account for 10% and 95% of total exports. Although the difference is small, it is
helpful to interpret the heterogeneous ERPT across countries: it can be partly attributed
to the different export entry ratios across countries. The pattern also provides a hint that
the globalization trend in past two decades, which brings a surge of new entrants into
international market, may play a role in explaining the declining ERPT phenomenon.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we compare the ERPT between new and continuing exporters. We find that
new exporters tend to have a smaller ERPT as they adjust their price more aggressively
in response to exchange rate shocks.
We develop a dynamic model in which firm-level future demand depends on their
current sales. For continuing exporters, since their reputation has been well established,
they have little incentive to cut their current export price to further increase their rep-
utation and future demand stock. As such, they maximize their current profits instead
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of the long-run profits. In contrast, new exporters have strong incentive to grow their
future demand by cutting their current price and increase their current sales. As such,
they need to maximize their long-run profit. The model predicts that in response to an
appreciation of the domestic currency, the new exporters cut their price more aggressively
than continuing exporters. This is because the accumulation of consumer base become
more difficult during appreciation period, and new exporters need to cut their price more
to increase current sales.
Using a detailed micro firm-product data from China during 2000-2009, we test the
model’s predictions. We find that although new exporters charge a lower export price
than continuing exporters, their exports are fewer than their continuing counterparts.
This is a proof of reputation effect. In addition, relative to continuing exporters, new
exporters adjust their price more aggressively in response to an exchange rate shock. Our
results are consistent with the model’s predictions and robust to different specifications.
To move further, this different ERPT between new and continuing exporters shed
light on the different ERPT across countries. All other things equal, countries with a
larger share of new exporters, tend to have a lower ERPT.
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Figure 1: Nominal Exchange Rate and Real Exchange Rate
25
(a) Figure 1: Mean Price Levels and Ages (b) Figure 2: Median Price Levels and Ages
(c) Figure 3: Mean Market Shares Levels and
Ages
(d) Figure 4: Median Market Shares Levels
and Ages
Table 1: Stylized Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables Obs Mean Std. Dev. Mini. Max.
Logarithm Export price 10348740 1.28 1.83 -10.18 17.74
Logarithm of export quantity 10348740 7.76 2.84 0 21.84
Import quantity 10347070 1.63 2.04 0 19.62
Number of destinations a firm exports 250374 4.66 2.13 1 17
Number of products a firm exports 250374 3.43 2.60 1 8
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Table 2: Price levels and Market Share with Firm’s Ages
Dependent Variable Price Market share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.077*** 0.079*** 0.073*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.010***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market share 0.397***
(0.005)
total import 0.000***
(0.000)
Product fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10348740 10348740 10348740 10348740 10348740 10348740
R2 0.578 0.563 0.578 0.441 0.310 0.452
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included
in all regressions. Columns 1–3 use price level for each ”firm-product-country” bundle within an year as
dependent variable, while columns 4–6 adopt the market share for dependent variables.
Table 3: Price levels and Market Share with Firm’s Ages
Dependent Variable Price Market share
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.110*** 0.111*** 0.105*** 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
age2 -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
market share 0.399***
(0.005)
total import 0.000***
(0.000)
Product fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 6974958 6974958 6974958 6974958 6974958 6974958
R2 0.572 0.556 0.572 0.440 0.328 0.453
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included
in all regressions. This robustness check deleting all firms which has appeared in sample of year 2000.
Columns 1–3 use price level for each ”firm-product-country” bundle within an year as dependent variable,
while columns 4–6 adopt the market share for each firm export a certain product at HS6 level to specific
country within the year as dependent variables.
27
Table 4: Price levels Regression with Entry Dummies
Dependent variable= log(price)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
entry1 -0.134*** -0.122*** -0.033*** -0.021***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
entry2 -0.147*** -0.135*** -0.044*** -0.031***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
total import 0.228*** 0.159*** 0.226*** 0.154***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
market share 0.332*** 0.152*** 0.327*** 0.154***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
country fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
product fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
firm fixed effect No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10348740 10347070 10348740 10347070 10348740 10347070 10348740 10347070
R2 0.575 0.576 0.958 0.958 0.575 0.577 0.958 0.958
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions.
Dependent variable is unit price for each export bundle at ”firm country-product” level. Entry dummy is defined at firm-product-
country pair. entry1 takes value 1 if a firm-product-country pair appears in year t but did not in year t − 1, 0 otherwise. entry1
take value 1 if a firm-product-country pair appears in year t but did not in year t− 1 and t− 2, 0 otherwise.
Table 5: Export Quantity Regression with Entry Dummies
Dependent variable=log(quantity)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
entry1 -1.197*** -0.249***
(0.001) (0.001)
(0.001) (0.001)
total import 0.002 0.266*** -0.002 0.265***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
market share 7.159*** 5.645*** 7.234*** 5.660***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.012) (0.012)
Firm-Prod-Ctry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 10348740 10347070 10348740 10347070
R2 0.413 0.409 0.902 0.902
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants
are included in all regressions. Dependent variable is export quantity for each export bun-
dle at ”firm country-product” level. Entry dummy is defined at firm-product-country pair.
entry1 takes value 1 if a firm-product-country pair appears in year t but did not in year t−1,
0 otherwise. entry1 take value 1 if a firm-product-country pair appears in year t but did not
in year t− 1 and t− 2, 0 otherwise.
28
Table 6: Export Price with Exchange Rate Changes
Dependent variable=log( price)
Panel A: Entry Panel B: Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆exr -0.093*** -0.091*** -0.097*** -0.095*** -0.138*** -0.136*** -0.142*** -0.141***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
∆exr × Entry1 -0.054*** -0.054***
(0.010) (0.010)
∆exr × Entry2 -0.048*** -0.049***
(0.010) (0.010)
∆exr × age 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.029*** 0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
∆exr × age2 -0.003* -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001)
total import -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
∆Marketshare -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070*** -0.070***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Firm-Prod-Ctry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501
R2 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions.
Dependent variable is export price for each export bundle at ”firm country-product” level.
Table 7: Export Quantity with Exchange Rate Changes
Dependent variable=log(quantity)
Panel A: Entry Panel B: Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆exr -0.866*** -0.828*** -0.796*** -0.757*** -0.312*** -0.281*** -0.293*** -0.334***
(0.021) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.035) (0.036) (0.039) (0.039)
∆exr × Entry1 1.320*** 1.312***
(0.024) (0.024)
∆exr × Entry2 1.274*** 1.262***
(0.024) (0.024)
∆exr × age -0.051*** -0.039*** -1.071*** -1.071***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.030) (0.030)
∆exr × age2 0.183*** 0.185***
(0.005) (0.005)
total import -0.100*** -0.100*** -0.188*** -0.194***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
∆Marketshare -1.104*** -1.103*** -1.311*** -1.310***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.015) (0.015)
Firm-Prod-Ctry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501 3525076 3524501
R2 0.012 0.015 0.012 0.015 0.471 0.474 0.472 0.474
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions.
Dependent variable is export quantity for each export bundle at ”firm country-product” level.
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Table 8: Major Product: Export price and quantity with Exchange Rate Changes
Panel A: Export Price Panel B: Export Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆exr -0.098*** -0.090*** -0.101*** -0.093*** -0.963*** -0.901*** -0.899*** -0.836***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
∆exr × Entry1 -0.068*** -0.067*** 1.901*** 1.915***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.045) (0.045)
∆exr × Entry2 -0.067*** -0.065*** 1.880*** 1.892***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.046) (0.046)
total import -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.147*** -0.147***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008)
∆Marketshare -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.272*** -0.270***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.011) (0.011)
Firm-Prod-Ctry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 749903 749709 749903 749709 749903 749709 749903 749709
R2 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.039 0.038 0.039
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions. Dependent
variable is export quantity for each export bundle at ”firm country-product” level. The sample is restrained to the major product (with
maximum export value in the year) for each individual firm.
Table 9: Single Product-Country: Export quantity with Exchange Rate Changes
Panel A: Export Price Panel A: Export Quantity
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆exr -0.162*** -0.159*** -0.161*** -0.158*** -1.594*** -1.533*** -1.563*** -1.502***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.079) (0.079) (0.078) (0.078)
∆exr × Entry1 -0.056* -0.052 2.753*** 2.788***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.094) (0.094)
∆exr × Entry2 -0.059* -0.055* 2.797*** 2.833***
(0.032) (0.032) (0.094) (0.095)
total import -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.173*** -0.174***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.016) (0.016)
∆ market share -0.044*** -0.044*** -0.235*** -0.233***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.024) (0.024)
Firm-Prod-Ctry fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 175626 175529 175626 175529 175626 175529 175626 175529
R2 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.098 0.099 0.098 0.099
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Constants are included in all regressions. Dependent
variable is export quantity for each export bundle at ”firm country-product” level. The sample is restrained to the single product-country
exporting bundle for each individual firm.
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Table 12: ERPT at Different Entry Ratios
entry ratio ERPT
1 10% 90.36%
2 25% 89.55%
3 50% 88.20%
4 75% 86.85%
5 95% 85.77%
Notes: All figures are based on authors’ own
calculation.
Table 13: Entry Ratio by Year
year entry ratio1 entry ratio2 number of firms
2000 - - 459216
2001 0.640 0.640 519,680
2002 0.643 0.607 636,052
2003 0.628 0.594 773,773
2004 0.656 0.624 896,960
2005 0.593 0.556 977,038
2006 0.687 0.653 1,335,420
2007 0.718 0.680 1,518,846
2008 0.604 0.573 1,584,144
2009 0.607 0.564 1,647,611
Notes: All figures are based on authors’ own calculation, and the data source
is from the Chinese General Administration of Customs.
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Proof
Lemma 1
Proof. In order to establish the proposition we compare V (qij,t−1) and V (q′ij,t−1) when
qij,t−1 < q′ij,t−1. Denote the optimal price sequence as {pijt}t when past market share is
qij,t−1. Observe that if the past sale is q′ij,t−1 and the firm follow the same sequence of
price choices {pijt}t, then in any period t > 0 the current profit of the firm with the past
sale q′ij,t−1 would be greater than that of the firm with the past sale qij,t−1. This implies:
pi(qij,t∗−1) < pi(q′ij,t∗−1) (A1)
pi(qij,t∗−1) = Ajt∗θ(qij,t∗−1)σ−1[pijt∗τjejt∗ + ηjwj]−σ(pijt∗ − cit)
pi(q′ij,t∗−1) = Ajt∗θ(q
′
ij,t∗−1)
σ−1[pijt∗τjejt∗ + ηjwj]−σ(pijt∗ − cit)
where the t∗ > t− 1 and qij,t∗−1 < q′ij,t∗−1. Since, θ and hence current demand, is strictly
increasing in past market share, qij,t−1, a firm can achieve a greater long-run profit relative
to an identical firm but with a smaller past sales by choosing the same price sequence
even if it is not optimal. As such V (q′ij,t−1) > V (qij,t−1) for any q
′
ij,t−1 > qij,t−1. Therefore,
V (qij,t−1)′ > 0.
peijtτ jt +τ jt ejt
∂peijt
∂ejt
> 0
Proof. We show the inequality by contradiction. Suppose peijtτjt+ τjtejt
∂peijt
∂ejt
< 0, due
to the concavity of V
′′
11(Mijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1), the second term in inequality (11) is positive.
This implies
∂peijt
∂ejt
>
∂pcijt
∂ejt
. However, according to inequality (10),
∂pcijt
∂ejt
= − ηjtwjt
(σ−1)τjt . As
such,
peijtτjt + τjtejt
∂peijt
∂ejt
> peijtτjt + τjejt
∂pcijt
∂ejt
=
σ
σ − 1citτjt −
σ
σ − 1ρEV
′
1(Mijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1)
≥ 0
The last inequality is because that any new exporters must earn at least non-negative
profits in order to be active. This is a contradiction.
Proposition 2 under serial correlated exchange rate shocks
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If the random shocks to exchange rate are serial correlated, we show a sufficient
condition with wihch Proposition 2 still hold. Suppose εjt = βεj,t−1 + uit, where β
capture the serial correlation between εjt and εj,t−1, uit is and i.i.d error term with mean
0. Since the shocks to exchange rate are serial correlated, a shock in period t will affect
the exchange rate expectation in period t+ 1. Therefore, when we take derivative to the
export price of new exporters, inequality (13) becomes
∂peijt
∂εjt
= − ηjtwjt
(σ − 1)τjt
1
e2jt
− σρ
(σ − 1)EV
′′
11(qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1)
∂qeijt
∂εjtjt
− σρβ
(σ − 1)EV
′′
13(qijt, fij,t+1, ej,t+1) (A2)
When the second term on the RHS of (A2) is negative, the third term on the RHS of
(A2) is positive. A sufficient condition to make inequality (15) continue to hold is that
the serial correlation between exchange rate shocks is sufficiently weak, a smaller β.The
second term on the RHS of (A2) will dominate the third term on the RHS of (A2). The
economic interpretation for the ambiguous relatioship casued by the the serial correlation
is that the consumer base accumulation becomes more difficult in response to a positive
exchange rate shock (an appreciation in the domestic currency) as current sales decreases.
On the one hand, new exporters need to decrease their price more in order to accumulate
their consumer base. On the other hand, because of the serial correlation, a positive
exchange rate shock increases the expectation of the future exchange rate, which lowers
the future values.30 As such, new exporters have lower incentive to lower their current
price to grow their consumer base and future demand. The sufficient condition says that
if the current exchange rate shock does not affect the expectation of future exchange rate
much, then the first mechanism makes new exporters to decrease their price more.
Stationary Equilibrium
We restrict our attention to stationary equilibria. A stationary equilibrium is a col-
lection of value function, firm’s price rule, firms’ productivity (marginal production cost).
1. All consumers optimally choose to consumption of differentiated goods based on
their brand reputation, θij. All firms optimally make entry and pricing decision
30 ∂V (qijt,fij,t+1,ej,t+!)
∂εjt
< 0, this is because that
∂piij,t+1
∂εjt
< 0.
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to maximize profit function (6)(for continuing exporters) or value function (8) (for
new entrants).
2. Free Entry: The expected value of entry for a new firm is zero
V Ej =
∫
ijt
∫
εjt
∫
cit
V (0, fj + ijt, ej + εjt)G
(ijt)G
ε(εjt)G
c(cit)ddεdc− Fj = 0
where Fj is the entry cost in country j.
3. Zero Cutoff: Active firms earn at least non-negative profits.
V (Mij,t−1, fijt, ejt) ≥ 0; for any new entrant i
pi(Mij,t−1, fijt, ejt) ≥ 0; for any continuing firm i;
4. Stationary: For each year and cohort, a cohort of age a in year t replicates the
previous cohort of age a in year t− 1.
Disaij,t−1(c) = Dis
a
ijt(c)
where Disaijt(c) denotes the marginal production cost distribution of a cohort of age
a in year t.
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